Haoran Wang
I am a Ph.D. candidate in Economics at University of Maryland and a Special Sworn Status (SSS) researcher at U.S. Census Bureau.
My research interests include macroeconomics, behavioral economics, firm dynamics, and monetary economics.
I am on the 2026-2027 job market.
| CV (Last updated: October 24, 2026) | Research Statement | Email: hw2688@umd.edu |
Job Market Paper
This paper studies how imperfect communication within firms shapes managerial expectations, input choices, and aggregate productivity. I develop a dynamic model of team production in which capital and labor managers share the firm’s objective but observe different information about productivity. The model yields restrictions on forecast-error predictability that jointly identify communication frictions and behavioral distortions in expectations data. Empirically, investment forecasts of U.S. public firms simultaneously underreact to news about hiring and overreact to news about investment. Complementary evidence from U.S. manufacturing establishments shows that managerial forecasts underreact more to news about the other manager’s decision when capital and labor decisions are made at different locations. Together, these findings are inconsistent with the common-information benchmark and support a model of firm dynamics with communication frictions. Quantitatively, communication friction generates substantial variations in the capital-labor ratio and large input misallocation. The associated aggregate productivity loss is approximately 5% relative to the frictionless allocation. This productivity loss is moderated by the negative covariance between the marginal revenue products generated by the communication friction.
Working Papers
I incorporate reinforcement learning into a quality-ladder model to study how firms innovate when the distribution of innovation returns across technological fields is unknown. Firms learn value functions from noisy market feedback following successful innovations and use these estimates to determine innovation expenditure and directions of external innovation. Learning makes innovation decisions path dependence conditional on firms' experience: favorable feedback reinforces innovation in existing fields and encourages expansion into nearby technologies, while unfavorable feedback redirects search toward more distant fields. Patent-level evidence from U.S. public firms is consistent with these predictions. Simulations of the calibrated model show that temporary market optimism produces persistent changes in the level and technological composition of patenting. Field-specific optimism redirects innovation toward favored technologies, while broad optimism raises patenting primarily through internal innovation, reducing the share of external innovation.
Setting the Wrong Price for the Right Reason: Consequences for Inflation and Monetary Policy (with Camilo Morales-Jimenez and Luminita Stevens)
[Updated Draft Coming Soon]
This paper studies how segmented information within firms affects the transmission of aggregate shocks. I develop a model in which each input manager observes their own input price but receives noisy signals about the other input manager’s price and firm demand, which I refer to as “narrow framing”. Although these frictions dampen firms’ responses to input prices in partial equilibrium, they can amplify aggregate fluctuations by weakening offsetting general equilibrium feedback. In an illustrative calibration, capital managers’ uncertainty about wages magnifies rental-rate movements and generates larger, more persistent capital responses to productivity shocks. Consumption responds less initially and more subsequently than under full information. Uncertainty about demand instead dampens the transmission of productivity shocks. These results show that the aggregate effects of information frictions depend on which decisions and feedback channels they affect.
Work In Progress
Labor Wedges under Adjustment Costs (with Martim Leitão)
